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Burks: Redefining Parenthood

REDEFINING PARENTHOOD:
CHILD CUSTODY AND
VISITATION WHEN
NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES
.DISSOLVE
Kristine L. Burks·
I. INTRODUCTIONl

In California, the determination of child custody and visitation rights is governed by inflexible and outdated definitions and
. rules, rather than by the reality of the family unit. Biology,:a le* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996. Sincere thanks to my editors Rebecca Weisman, Monica McCrary, Gregg Zywicke, and Professor Roberta Simon
for keeping this article focused and moving forward.
1. Throughout this article references are made to sections of the California Civil
Code, specifically the Uniform Parentage Act and Family Law Act. Effective January I,
1994 these sections were repealed and replaced with equivalent provisions in the Family
Code. Stats. 1992 c. 162 (A.B. 2650), §§ 3-4, operative Jan. I, 1994. Unless otherwise
indicated, there is no change in the substantive law. To the extent there is no change in
the substantive law, a provision under the Family Code is considered a restatement and
continuation of the previously existing provision, not a new enactment. CAL. FAMILY
CODE § 2 (West 1993). The author has chosen to refer to the repealed sections because
these statutes are cited in the cases discussed in the article.
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7001 (West 1983) (defining "parent and child relationship" as
"the legal relationship existing between a child and his [sic] natural or adoptive parents
incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties and obligations.")
(recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7601 (West 1993». In the rare instance where two
women claim to be a child's natural mother, one based on a genetic relationship with the
child and the other on the fact that she gave birth to the child, the court may look to the
intentional acts of the parties in making its determination. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d
776, 782 (Cal. 1993). In a maternity dispute arising out of a surrogacy agreement, the
California Supreme Court looked to the parties' intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agreement to determine who was the child's natural mother. The court held that
"she who intended to bring about the birth of the child that she intended to raise as her
own-is the child's natural mother." Id. The court found that presentation of blood test
evidence and proof of having given birth to a child are but two means of establishing
maternity. Id. at 779.
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gal adoption, 8 and marriage to a woman who bears a child4 are
the only means currently available for attaining the legal status
of parent. 1i Nevertheless, courts have had to determine custody,
visitation, and child support rights for families who fall outside
the traditional one mother and one father family model. s The
California Legislature has limited the status of "legal parent"7 to
those with a biological, adoptive, or marital tie to a child. California courts consistently give a narrow interpretation of statutes conferring jurisdiction and standing to assert rights to custody and visitation. Together, the Legislature and the courts
have effectively prohibited many nonlegal parents formerly involved in nontraditional relationshipss from asserting or obtaining any rights to child custody or visitation. 9 Thus, individuals who function as children's parents,1° but who lack the legal
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7001.
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (West 1983) (presuming a man is the biological father
if he meets conditions set forth in Evidence Code section 621, or if he and the mother are
married, or if before the child is born, he and the mother attempt to marry, or if after
the child is born, he and the mother marry or attempt to marry or the father engages in
conduct holding the child out as his own) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7611 (West
1993».
5. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families,
78 GEO. L.J. 459, 483 (1990).
6. Id. (defining traditional family as "one mother/one father").
7. Hereinafter, the author will use the term "legal parent" to refer to those whose
parent-child relationships derive from biology, adoption, or marriage to a woman who
bears a child. The author will use the term "nonlegal parent" to refer to those whose
parent-child relationships derive from other means.
8. Hereinafter, the author uses the terms "nontraditional family" and "nontraditional relationship" to refer to family relationships extending beyond the traditional one
mother/one father model. The relationship which is considered "nontraditional" is the
relationship between the "parents." Nontraditional relationships include stepparents,
same-sex partners, and unmarried heterosexuals.
9. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 (Ct. App. 1991) (affirming lesbian partner was not a "parent" where she was not the biological or adoptive
mother and she and the biological mother did not have a legally recognized marriage
when the child was born); Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990)
(affirming lesbian partner was without standing to seek custody or visitation); Perry v.
Superior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583, 585 (Ct. App. 1988) (affirming superior court lacked
jurisdiction in a marriage dissolution proceeding to award visitation of wife's children to
husband/stepparent; although, in response to the court's decision, Civil Code section
4351.5 was enacted in 1982 giving stepparents certain rights to visitation); In re Marriage
of Goetz & Lewis, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32 (Ct. App. 1988) (affirming superior court without
jurisdiction in a marriage dissolution proceeding to consider stepfather's custody
request).
10. Hereinafter, the author uses the term "functional parent" to refer to "anyone
who maintains a functional parental relationship with a child when a legally recognized
parent created that relationship with the intent that the relationship be parental in na-
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status of parents, are often left with no parental rights should
their relationships with the legal parents dissolve. In addition,
children are deprived of ongoing relationships with individuals
they look upon as their parents.
This article offers a method of providing custody and visitation rights to individuals formerly involved in nontraditional relationships who function as children's parents but who lack the
legal status of parent. The article considers a broad range of
nontraditional families, including stepparents, same-sex partners, and unmarried heterosexuals. l l
The article begins with a summary of California statutory
law. The author examines how "parent" is defined and the limitations imposed on those falling outside that definition when
they seek to assert rights to child custody and visitation. Next,
the article focuses on three types of nontraditional relationships
to illustrate how California courts have applied the statutory law
and how that application limits nonlegal parents'12 ability to
gain standing to assert claims for custody and visitation and limits courts' subject matter jurisdiction to consider such claims. In
cases where nonlegal parents overcome the standing and jurisdictional issues and make it into court, the article shows how the
law works to summarily deny their claims, without considering
any functional parent-child relationship that may have existed.
Next, the article examines existing legal theories under
which nonlegal parents attempt to use their functional relationships to establish parental rights. The article also explores the
failure of these theories to provide for functional parents or to
adequately protect the rights of legally recognized parents from
outside parties. The article then considers three innovative apture." Polikoff, supra note 5, at 464.
11. Two recent notes focus specifically on the law's impact on lesbian-mother families. See Lisa M. Pooley, Note, Heterosexism and Children's Best Interests: Conflicting
Concepts in Nancy S. II. Michelle G., 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 477 (1993); Elizabeth A. Delaney,
Note, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally Recognizing the Relationship
Between the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and Her Child, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 177 (1991).
12. The author uses the term "nonlegal parent" when not referring specifically to
the rights of functional parents, as opposed to "functional parent," because not every
individual asserting custody and visitation rights based on their relationship meets the
definition of functional parent. See infra part V.B. for the author's proposed definition
of functional parent.
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proaches to resolving child custody and visitation disputes arising out of nontraditional relationships which do establish rights
for functional parents.
In conclusion, the author advises the California Legislature
to redefine "legal parent" to include functional parents. The author recommends specific criteria for determining when a functional parent-child relationship exists, taking into account the
extent of the relationship itself, the child's perceptions of the
relationship and the legal parent's intent in creating the relationship. This approach allows functional parents to seek custody and visitation according to the same standards as other legal parents, while protecting legal parents from attempts by
outside parties to establish parental rights.
II. CALIFORNIA STATUTORY LAW

The Uniform Parentage Act I8 (hereinafter "UPA") defines a
legal parent as the biological or adoptive parent of the child. 14
Under the UPA a mother may establish a parent-child relationship by proof of having given birth to the child. III The UP A provides a number of ways for a father to establish a parent-child
relationship.I6 Mothers and fathers can also establish a parent13. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983). The UPA was part of a package of
legislation introduced in 1975. It "deals substantively with the rights of children and
procedurally with the determination of parentage." Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal Rptr. 520,
522 (Ct. App. 1990). The legislation's purpose was to eliminate the legal distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children. Under the UPA, parent and child rights are
based on the existence of a parent-child relationship rather than on the marital status of
the parents. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778-79 (Cal. 1993).
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7001.
15. CAL. CIY. CODE § 7003(1) (West 1983) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7610(a)
(West 1993». In rare cases, maternity may be established by other means. See supra
note 2 and accompanying text.
16. [d. § 7003(2)(3) (providing father-child relationship exists where father is the
biological or adoptive parent) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7610(b)(c) (West 1993»;
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004 (see supra note 4 and accompanying test) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7611 (West 1993»; CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(a) (West 1983) (providing that
where wife is impregnated through artificial insemination with consent of her husband,
husband is considered biological father by law) (recodified as' CAL. FAMILY CODE
§ 7613(a) (West 1993»; CAL. CIY. CODE § 7006 (West 1983) (providing by whom and
under what circumstances an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a father-child relationship may be brought) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE §§ 7630-7634
(West 1993».
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child relationship through proof of adoption.17
A.

CHILD CUSTODY

California Civil Code section 4600,18 part of the Family Law
Act I9 (hereinafter "FLA"), expressly recognizes that courts
should award custody to legal parents in preference to nonlegal
parents. lIO Section 4600 applies to "any proceeding where there is
at issue the custody of a minor child. "lII This section alone does
not create subject matter jurisdiction. 22 An underlying proceeding is required. 28
In custody disputes between legal parents, section 4600 permits the court to award custody according to the "best interests"
of the child.lI4 Yet, in disputes between legal parents and nonlegal parents, individuals falling outside the narrow statutory definition of legal parent given above must show that custody with
the legal parents would be detrimental to the children. 211 This
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003(3).
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1993) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE
§§ 3020-3021, 3040-3043 (West 1993».
19. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5180 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993). The FLA was adopted
in 1970 and made substantive and procedural changes in the law governing what had
traditionally been termed "divorce" and "annulment." 11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 22 (9th ed. 1990). With respect to child custody, a general objective of the
FLA was to limit the power of the court to award custody to nonlegal parents. Prior to
the FLA, a best interests standard was used in custody disputes between legal and nonlegal parents. Under the FLA, this standard was replaced with Civil Code section 4600(b)
which provides an order of preference for courts to follow in awarding custody. 10 id. at
§§ 116-17.
20. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(1) (West 1983) (providing that custody should be
awarded first to both parents jointly or to either parent) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE
§ 3040(a) (West 1993». See In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 257 (Cal. 1974), the seminal case
interpreting section 4600.
21. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (West Supp. 1993) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE
§ 3021 (West 1993». The Legislature has excepted certain proceedings from section
4600. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(d) (West 1983) (providing that section 4600 shall
not apply in actions to declare minor free from parental custody and control) (recodified
as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7807 (West 1993».
22. In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32 (Ct. App. 1988); B.G., 523
P.2d at 255 n.24; Marckwardt v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 41, 47 (Ct. App. 1984);
Perry v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583, 585 (Ct. App. 1980).
23. Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
24. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b). See B.G., 523 P.2d at 257; Nancy S. v. Michelle G.,
279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 (Ct. App. 1991).
25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c) (West 1983) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 3041
(West 1993». ("Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or per-
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"detriment" standard is considerably more restrictive than the
"best interests" standard which the courts apply in disputes between legal parents/ole California courts have also applied this
detriment standard where the nonlegal parent seeks not to exclude the legal parent but to share custody with the legal parent.27 While legal parents may petition the court for joint custody of a child,28 the law does not provide for joint custody
between a legal and nonlegal parent when the legal parent objects. 29 In situations where the legal parent objects to joint custody with the nonlegal parent, the nonlegal parent must show
that custody with the legal parent is detrimental to the child. 30
The law sets up a "Catch 22" situation for the nonlegal parent.
By requiring the nonlegal parent to show that custody with the
legal parent is detrimental to the child, the nonlegal parent is
forced to choose between seeking sole custody or no custody. A
nonlegal parent who seeks to establish joint custody, over the
objections of the legal parent, is left without a legal remedy.31
Thus, the restriction for nonlegal parents is twofold. First,
by limiting the definition of parent, the UP A initially limits
which individuals can assert "parental" rights. Second, nonlegal
parents who have standing, but who fall outside this definition
of legal parent, must show that custody with the legal parents
would be detrimental to the children before the court will award
them custody.a2

sons other than a parent without the consent of the parents, it shall make a finding that
an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to a
nonparent is required to serve the best interests of the child.").
26. B.G., 523 P.2d at 257 ("As between parents, [section 4600] permits the court to
award custody 'according to the best interests of the child,' but in a dispute between a
parent and a nonparent, the section imposes the additional stipulation that an award to
the nonparent requires a finding that 'an award of custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child.... ) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b), (c».
27. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(1); supra note 20 and accompanying text.
29. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(d)(3) (West 1983) (" 'Joint physical custody' means that
each of the parents shall have significant periods of physical custody.") (emphasis
added): id. § 4600.5(d)(5) (" 'Joint legal custody' means that both parents shall share
the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education
and welfare of a child.") (emphasis added).
30. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c).
31. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216: Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 521
(Ct. App. 1990): In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 30 (Ct. App. 1988).
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c). See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
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VISITATION

California Civil Code section 4601 gives the court discretion
to grant reasonable visitation rights "to any other person having
an interest in the welfare of the child. "33 However, this section
only applies where there is already some proceeding properly
before the court in which custody is at issue. 34 Individuals who
are without an underlying proceeding, such as one for marriage
dissolution, are unable to bring actions for visitation. In marriage dissolution proceedings, any interested person may join the
action and bring an action for visitation whether or not custody
or visitation is at issue between the husband and wife. 311
Section 4601 does not provide a standard for the court to
use in determining whether to award visitation. However, the
California Court of Appeal has held that in visitation disputes
between legal and nonlegal parents, where legal parents are in
joint-opposition to visitation, nonlegal parents must present
clear and convincing evidence that the denial of such visitation
would be detrimental to the children. 36
Prior to 1982, courts had held that superior courts' jurisdiction to award visitation in marital dissolution proceedings was
limited to "children of the marriage."37 Thus, superior courts
were without jurisdiction to award visitation rights to stepparents in marriage dissolution proceedings. 3s In response to what
one court referred to as the "thorny problem of visitation by
stepparents,"39 the' Legislature enacted California Civil Code
section 4351.5 which, in marriage dissolution proceedings, confers jurisdiction on superior courts to award reasonable visitation rights to stepparents and grandparents when the courts determine that visitation by that person is in the best interests of
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West 1983) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 3100
(West 1993».
34. Perry v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583, 584 (Ct. App 1980); In re Marriage
of Halpern, 184 Cal. Rptr. 740, 745 (Ct. App. 1982).
35. In re Marriage of Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862, 863. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
36. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 867. See infra part I1I.C. for a discussion of how the
standard was conceived.
37. Perry, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 586.
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the child.· o Courts have consistently held section 4351.5 inapplicable to factual situations not specifically addressed by that section. n For example, courts have held the statute inapplicable to
a non biological parent in a same-sex relationship.·2
The Legislature and the courts have chosen to make the
rights of biological and adoptive parents paramount..a Even discretionary visitation provided to some nonlegal parents "must
give way to the paramount right to parent if the visitation creates conflicts and problems."" Nonlegal parents who are unable
to avail themselves of an underlying proceeding, a requisite to
asserting rights to custody under section 4600 and visitation
under section 4601, are unable to bring their claims and, therefore, go unheard. Under existing law, many individuals are denied any rights to custody or visitation because they lack biological, adoptive, or marital links to the children-regardless of the
existence of functional parent-child relationships.
III. RELATIONSHIPS
ADDRESS

EXISTING

LAW

FAILS

TO

Existing law fails to adequately address the reality of families falling outside the traditional model. Courts consistently resolve custody and visitation disputes in favor of legal parents
regardless of the functional relationships existing between nonlegal parents and children.· 11 As discussed in the preceding section, the statutory law on its face severely limits the custody and
visitation rights of nonlegal parents.· 8 In turn, the courts have
often given the statutes an even narrower interpretation. Using
recent case law, this section examines how courts have interpreted current statutory law to find courts lack subject matter
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5(a) (West 1983) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE
§3101(a) (West 1993».
41. Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 217 (Ct. App. 1991).
42.Id.
43. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b), (c); In re
B.G., 523, P.2d 244, 257 (Cal. 1974); supra note 26 and accompanying text.
44. In re Marriage of Jenkens, 172 Cal. Rptr. 331,334 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoted in
Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17).
45. See Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991); Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990); In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis 250 Cal. Rptr.
30 (Ct. App. 1988).
46. See discussion supra part II.
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jurisdiction to determine the parental rights of nonlegal parents
and to deny nonlegal parents standing to assert parental rights.
This section also illustrates the laws' impact on three different
nontraditional families. The author does not suggest that every
nonlegal parent involved in a nontraditional relationship should
be entitled to custody and visitation. The author does suggest
that courts should not exclude these individuals from asserting
such rights merely because they lack biological, adoptive, or
marital ties to the children.
A. STEPPARENTS 47

Stepparent situations arise when two people marry and one
or both partners have a child[ren] from a previous relationship.
A stepparent is the non biological parent of his or her spouse's
child[ren]. Should the marriage end in divorce, stepparents
often bring actions for custody and visitation. The California
Court of Appeal has found that trial courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction to consider stepparents' claims for custody of
stepchildren. 48 However, California Civil Code section 4351.5
confers subject matter jurisdiction on trial courts in marriage
dissolution proceedings to award stepparents reasonable visitation rights. 49
In In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis,50 the California Court
of Appeal affirmed that existing statutory law did not provide
the superior court with subject matter jurisdiction to award a
stepparent joint custody of his stepchild. 51 In Goetz, the stepfather, Stephen, requested joint custody and reasonable visitation
rights for both parties in his marriage dissolution proceeding. 52.
The stepchild was born in 1980. 58 Stephen and the child's
mother had lived together from 1980 to 1985. 54 During that time
47. Although stepparent relationships are arguably not "nontraditional," they are
discussed here because as nonbiological, nonadoptive parents, stepparents are deprived
of certain parental rights, despite evidence of functional parent-child relationships.
48. Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
49. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5(a).
50. In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis 250 Cal. Rptr. 30 (Ct. App. 1988).
51. Id. at 32-33.
52.Id.
53. Id. at 30.
54. Id. at 31.
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the couple was married for one year. 1I1I The mother's petition for
dissolution alleged there were no minor children of the marriage. 1I6 Stephen's petition alleged there was a minor child of the
marriage "based on his acknowledgment of [the child] as his
son."117 He based his request for custody on California Civil Code
section 4600. 116 The requisite underlying proceeding in this case
was for marriage dissolution. 1I9 The court, however, found that
the jurisdiction conferred on a court by marriage dissolution
proceedings to deal with the custody and visitation rights of
stepparents is limited by California Civil Code sections 4351 60
and 4351.5. 61 Section 4351 gives the court jurisdiction in a marriage dissolution proceeding to make any orders, as appropriate,
regarding child custody.62 Section 4351.5, notwithstanding 4351,
gives the court jurisdiction to award "reasonable visitation
rights" to a stepparent when such an award is in the child's best
interest. 68 The court construed the two sections to limit its jurisdiction to awarding only visitation. Absent express provisions for
custody in section 4351.5, the court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider a stepparent's rights to custody.64
Stephen was granted visitation rights under California Civil
Code section 4351.5. 611
While the extent of Stephen's relationship with the child
was in dispute,66 even if it were undisputed that he functioned
as the child's parent in every way, the result would have been
the same. Stephen was never afforded the opportunity to attempt to prove a parent-child relationship existed because the
55. [d.
56. [d.
57. [d.
58. [d. at 31; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) ("In any proceeding where there is at issue
the custody of a minor child, the court may . . . make such order for the custody of the
child ... as may seem necessary or proper.").
59. [d. at 33.
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351 (West 1983) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE §§ 2010,
2060 ) (West 1993».
61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5; Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 31-32.
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351 ("The superior court has jurisdiction to inquire into and
render any judgment and make such orders as are appropriate concerning status of the
marriage, custody and support of minor children of the marriage, and children for whom
support is authorized under Section 206.")
63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5(a).
64. Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
65. [d. at 31.
66. [d.
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court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the
custody rights of a stepparent. 67
Although a recent case affirmed an award of custody to a
stepfather, it remained consistent with the holding in Goetz. In
In re Marriage of Hinman,68 the California Court of Appeal affirmed an award of joint custody of five children to the husband,
Howard. Three of the children were his biological children and
two his stepchildren. 69 The wife, and legal parent, designated all
of the children as "children of the marriage" in her dissolution
petition and stipulated to granting Howard joint custody.70 After
the court entered final judgment, the wife challenged the court's
jurisdiction to award Howard custody of the two stepchildren
because he was not their biological father.71 The Court of Appeal
affirmed the custody award under principles of waiver and estoppel. The court held that the wife's designation of the two
stepchildren as "children of the marriage" in her petition and
subsequent stipulation awarding the stepfather primary physical
custody precluded her from later challenging the order on jurisdictional grounds. 72 The court held that jurisdiction does not
"vanish" even if it is later shown that there were no children of
the marriage. 73
The Court of Appeal did not find the trial court had jurisdiction to award custody based on any statute. In fact, the court
noted that the trial court's award of joint custody may have exceeded its statutory authority because the children were
stepchildren. 74 The court acknowledged that in previous cases
where the mothers did not designate the children as "of the
marriage" and objected to the stepparents' attempts to gain custody, the courts correctly held that the stepparents had no statutory basis on which to predicate their custody requests.711 How67. Id. at 32-33.
68. In re Marriage of Hinman, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 245 (Ct. App. 1992).
69. Id. at 248
70. Id. at 245-46.
71. Id. at 246.
72. Id. at 247 ("A party who participates in or consents to a judgment which otherwise would be beyond the court's authority is precluded from attacking it, absent exceptional circumstances.").
73.Id.
74. Id. at 248.
75. Id. at 247 (citing Perry v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583 (Ct. App. 1980); In
re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30 (Ct. App. 1988».
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ever, the Hinman court reasoned that the mother herself
invoked the court's jurisdiction by alleging in her petition that
the children were of the marriage. 7s That allegation alone conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court to decide
custody of the children. 77 Thus, the Court of Appeal's decision
remained consistent with previous decisions holding that stepparents have no statutory grounds on which to base custody
requests. 7S
While superior courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to
award custody to stepparents, California Civil Code section
4351.5 gives the courts jurisdiction to award them reasonable
visitation. Although stepparents' rights are limited, they are not
in danger of losing all rights with regard to their stepchildren.
B.

SAME-SEX

PARTNERS79

Same-sex partner custody and visitation disputes may arise
where two people of the same sex decide to conceive and raise a
child together either through adoption, artificial insemination, or
other means. Such a dispute can also arise where one partner
brings a child from a previous relationship to the same-sex relationship, much like a stepparent relationship. Except in the rare
case of a second parent adoption,90 only one of the "parents"
will be the child's legal parent. Should the relationship dissolve,
the nonlegal parent may attempt to bring an action for custody
and visitation.
Same-sex partners are even more disadvantaged in their
pursuit of custody and visitation than are stepparents. In addition to the jurisdictional problems faced by stepparents, samesex partners also have difficulty gaining standing to assert their
rights. Because stepparents are married to the legal parents,
they gain standing to at least assert visitation rights through
76. Hinman, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246.
77. Id. at 247.
78. Id. See Perry, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 584; Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 31-32.
79. The author uses the term "same-sex partner" to refer to the nonbiological or
nonadoptive parent in a same-sex relationship.
80. A second parent adoption is where two people of the same sex are permitted to
adopt a single child.
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their marriage dissolution proceedings. 81 However, because the
law does not recognize same-sex marriages,82 same-sex partners
must find alternative ways to gain standing to assert their rights
to custody and visitation.8S
In Curiale v. Reagan,84 the California Court of Appeal affirmed a non biological, same-sex parent was without standing to
initiate a proceeding seeking custody and visitation. 86 Curiale, a
partner in a lesbian relationship, sought custody of and visitation with a child born to her partner during their relationship.
Curiale and the child's biological mother shared a home for five
years during which time they decided to have a child through
artificial insemination and raise the child together. 88 The child
was born in 1985.87 From the time of the child's birth until June
1988, Curiale provided the sole financial support for herself, the
biological mother and the child. 88 Although the couple's relationship ended in December 1987, the couple entered into a written
agreement89 which provided for sharing physical custody of the
child. 90 However, in June 1988, the biological mother informed
Curiale she was no longer willing to share custody with Curiale
or even allow Curiale to visit with the child. 91
Curiale brought an action for custody and visitation. She
based her claims on California Civil Code sections 7015, 7020,
and 4600. Sections 7015 and 7020 are part of the UP A which
81. CAL. CIV. Coos § 4351.5. See Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
82. California does not recognize same-sex marriages. CAL. CIV. Coos § 4100 (West
1983) (defining marriage as "a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a
man and a woman . . . . ") (recodified as CAL. FAMILY Coos § 300 (West 1993».
83. An apparent solution to this dilemma would be for the same-sex partner to
adopt his or her partner's child. However, traditionally, same-sex partners could not
adopt a child without divesting their married partner of their parental rights. Only a few
second parent adoptions have been allowed in California, as statutory law does not specifically provide for such. Delaney, supra note 11, at 215 (proposing statutory recognition
of second parent adoptions); CAL. CIV. Coos § 221.76 (West Supp. 1993) (recodified as
CAL. FAMILY Coos § 8617 (West 1993».
84. Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 521 (Ct. App. 1990).
85. [d.

86. [d.
87. [d.
88. [d.

89. Although Curiale attached a copy of the agreement to her complaint, the trial
court declined to give it any effect. Curiale did not assert any contractual claims in the
trial court nor on appeal. [d. at 522 n.1.
90. [d. at 521.
91. [d.
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deals with the rights of children and the determination of parentage. 92 Section 7015 confers standing on any interested party
to bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of
a mother and child relationship.9s Curiale asserted her claim as
an interested party and sought to establish the existence of a
mother-child relationship.94
Section 7015 does not specify the grounds for establishing a
mother-child relationship.911 However, the Curiale court found
the grounds for establishing a parent-child relationship under
section 7015 are limited to biology and adoption. Thus, because
the identity of the biological mother was undisputed, the court
found section 7015 inapplicable to a lesbian-partner because, in
the eyes of the court, a child could not have two mothers.96 The
court reasoned, "While Civil Code section 7015 confers standing
upon any interested person to bring an action to determine the
existence or not of a parent-child relationship, it has no application where, as here, it is undisputed defendant is the natural
mother of the child."97 As in the stepparent situation presented
in Goetz, the court declined to consider the functional relationship between Curiale and the child as a basis for establishing the
existence of a mother-child relationship under section 7015.
Curiale also based her custody action on California Civil
Code section 4600. 98 As explained previously, section 4600 alone
does not confer subject matter jurisdiction. 99 Jurisdiction depends on a proceeding properly before the court in which
custody is at issue. loo The issue of custody and visitation may be
raised in the following proceedings: determination of maternitylOl or paternity,t°2 marriage dissolution,t°s guardian92. [d. at 522.
93. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7015
(West 1993».
94. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr.
95. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7015.
96. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr.
97. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr.

(West 1983) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7650
at 522.
at 522. See also, Delaney, supra note 11, at 181.
at 522.

98. [d.

99. See discussion supra part II.A.
100. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
101. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7015.
102. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006.
103. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4350 (West 1983) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 310
(West 1993)); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.
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ship/04 juvenile dependency/oil habeus corpus,1°s adoption,107
and termination of parental rights. lOS
For the reasons discussed above, Curiale could not bring an
action to establish maternity.l09 As an unmarried, same-sex partner, Curiale could not bring a dissolution proceeding.llo Because
Curiale sought to share custody with the child's biological
mother, not to exclude her, Curiale did not bring a guardianship
action or one to terminate parental rights. l l l A juvenile dependency proceeding requires an allegation that the biological parent is unfit.ll2 Curiale was seeking to establish joint-custody and
was therefore not making that claim. llS Traditionally under California law, a same-sex partner cannot adopt a child unless the
biological parent of the same-sex consents and relinquishes his
or her own parental rightsY' Finally, a writ of habeus corpus
can only be used by one who is entitled to custody of a child to
regain custody of that child from another who is not legally entitled to custody.llII Because Curiale lacked standing to avail herself of any of these proceedings, she could not bring her
claims. lls The court concluded, "The Legislature has not conferred upon one in plaintiff's position, a nonlegal parent in a
same sex relationship, any right of custody or visitation upon
the termination of the relationship."ll7
Nancy S. u. Michelle G.llS also involved a custody and visi104. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1500 (West 1991).
105. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994).
106. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1507 (West 1991).
107. CAL. CIV. CODE § 221.10 (West 1991) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 8600
(West 1993».
108. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 232-233 (West 1991) (recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7820
(West 1993».
109. Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990)
110. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100; supra note 82 and accompanying text.
111. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
112. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300.
113. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
114. Delaney, supra note 11, at 184; CAL. CIV. CODE § 221.20 (recodified as CAL.
FAMILY CODE § 8604-06 (West 1993»; CAL. CIV. CODE § 221.76. See supra note 83 for
discussion of recent exceptions to the traditional rule.
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1507 (West 1991).
116. Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522.

117. Id.
118. Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991).
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tation dispute arising out of a lesbian relationship.u9 In this
case, the couple lived together for eleven years prior to the birth
of the first child in 1980. 120 A second child was born in 1984. 121
The couple planned to raise the children together and Michelle,
the lesbian partner, participated in the artificial insemination of
the biological mother.122 The children's birth certificates listed
Michelle as the children's "father" and both children took
Michelle's last name. 123 The· children referred to each of the
women as "mom. "124 Although the couple separated in 1985,
they reached a custody agreement and followed it for the next
three years until the biological mother sought to alter the arrangement. 1211 When Michelle objected, the biological mother initiated an action seeking a declaration that (1) Michelle was not
a legal parent; (2) the biological mother was entitled to sole legal
and physical custody; and (3) Michelle was entitled to visitation
only upon consent of the biological mother.126
The court found it had jurisdiction under the UP A to decide whether Michelle was a parent of the children. 127 The court
reasoned that because Michelle had at all times maintained she
was a parent of the children, she had standing to seek custody
and visitation. 128 However, the court determined that Michelle
could not establish a parent-child relationship because she was
not the biological mother, had not adopted the children, and she
and the children's biological mother did not have a legally recognized marriage when the children were born.u9 In determining
that Michelle was not a parent, the court ignored any functional
parental relationship which may have existed. The court's holdmg was based solely on the narrow statutory definition of
parent.
Because the court held Michelle was not a legal parent, sec1l9.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

[d. at 216.
[d. at 214.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 215 n.2. Although the court did not specify. the court presumably found

Michelle had jurisdiction under Civil Code section 7015.
128. [d. at 215 n.2.
129. [d. at 215.
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tion 4600's detriment standard applied. 180 Before the court could
award Michelle custody over the objections of the biological
mother, the court would have to find that custody with the biological mother would be detrimental to the children. However,
because Michelle sought to share custody, not to exclude the biological mother, she was not making this claim and therefore
was denied custody.
In Nancy S. the court acknowledged that the record
"strongly suggests" that the lesbian partner could prove that she
had, from the children's point of view, performed the role of loving mother.l3l The court also agreed that the absence of any legal relationship to the children had resulted in a "tragic situation."132 Nonetheless, the court held that Michelle was "entitled
to seek custody and visitation over the objections of the children's biological mother, based on the 'best interests' of the children, only if she has alleged facts upon which the court could
determine that she was a parent of the children."188 Michelle's
role as loving mother was an insufficient basis for establishing a
parent-child relationship.
The court's findings in Nancy S. appear to conflict with the
California Court of Appeal's holding in Curiale. In Nancy S. the
court found it had jurisdiction under the UP A to decide whether
Michelle was a parent. 134 In Curiale the court found the UP A
inapplicable. 131i Because Curiale could not avail herself of an underlying proceeding, the court also found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider her claims under section 4600. 188 One
possible explanation for this conflict is that in Nancy S. the biological mother's action for a declaration that Michelle was not
the children's parent provided the underlying proceeding necessary for Michelle to assert her own parental rights. 187 Because of
the unpredictable nature by which same-sex partners are able to
gain standing to assert their claims, it is difficult for them to be
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See CAL. CIY. CODE § 4600(c).
Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215 n.4.
ld. at 219.
ld. at 215; CAL. CIY. CODE §§ 4600(b), 7003(1).
Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990).
ld.
Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214. See also, Delaney, supra note 11, at 186 (reconciling Curiale and Nancy S).
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apprised of their legal rights when making family planning decisions. Indeed, a same-sex partner's ability to assert any parental
rights may depend on someone else first bringing an action. lss

C.

UNMARRIED HETEROSEXUALS

Unmarried heterosexual custody and visitation disputes
may arise where third parties develop relationships with other's
children. The most common example is where a girlfriend or
boyfriend of the legal parent attempts to bring an action for custody and visitation when their relationship with the biological
parent dissolves and an ongoing relationship with the child is
unlikely.ls9
As nonlegal parents, unmarried heterosexual partners cannot obtain custody without first showing that custody with the
legal parents is detrimental to the children and that custody
with the nonlegal parents is in the children's best interests. ao
The standard applied to actions for visitation is less clear. Only
one case has addressed the nature of the findings necessary to
award visitation. 141
In In re Marriage of Gayden, a2 the California Court of Appeal held courts should not grant visitation under Civil Code
section 4601 without clear and convincing evidence that denial
of such would be detrimental to the child. as In Gayden, the
court reversed a trial court's grant of visitation to a father's former girlfriend. 144 The father petitioned the court for the dissolu138. See also Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986). A biological
mother's lesbian partner was able to gain standing and establish visitation rights in a
sperm donor's paternity action. His action provided the underlying proceeding necessary
for the lesbian partner to assert her rights to visitation. Unlike the biological mothers in
Curiale and Nancy S., the biological mother in Jhordan C. did not oppose visitation
with the lesbian partner, as their relationship had not dissolved. Id. at 533, 537.
139. Unmarried heterosexual relationships might also include friends of legal
parents.
140. CAL. CIV, CODE § 4600(c).
141. In re Marriage of Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862, 867 (Ct. App. 1991).
142. In re Marriage of Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Ct. App. 1991).
143. 'Id. at 867; CAL, CIV, CODE § 4601 ("The court shall order reasonable visitation
rights to a parent unless it is shown that the visitation would be detrimental to the child.
In the discretion of the court, reasonable visitation rights may be granted to any other
person having an interest in the welfare of the child.").
144. Id. at 869.
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tion of his marriage in August of 1986. 1411 Following the dissolution in February 1988, the court granted the father custody of
the child and the mother visitation rights. 14e The court subsequently allowed the father's former girlfriend to be joined as a
party to the proceeding. 147 The girlfriend based her claim for
visitation rights on her status as the child's "de facto parent."148
In her declaration, she stated that she had lived with the father
and the child from the time the child was seven months old until
she was one year and nine months 01d. 14e She also alleged that
when the cohabitation ended, she continued to see the child frequently until she and the father ended their relationship. The
child was three and a half years old at that time. lllo The girlfriend also charged that the child's mother had abdicated her
parental rights by abandoning the child when the child was
seven months old and that the girlfriend was the only mother
the child had ever known. 1111
The father acknowledged that he and his former girlfriend
had "an on-again, off-again" relationship for two years and lived
together for six months. 11l2 Both the mother and father disputed
the extent of the girlfriend's relationship with the child and believed that the girlfriend's continued involvement with the child
would be detrimental to the child and the child's ongoing relationship with her parents. IllS The family counselor agreed that
visitation in an atmosphere of hostility and bitterness would be
harmful to the child, and a child psychologist declared that visitation would not be in the child's best interests.lII4
145. [d. at 863.
146. [d.
147. [d.; CAL. R. CT., rule 1252(b) (West Revised Ed. 1993) (UA person who has or
claims custody or physical control of any of the minor children of the marriage or visitation rights with respect to such children may apply to the court for an order joining him
[sic] as a party to the proceeding."). Because the girlfriend was making such a claim, the
court allowed her to be joined. The issue of custody or visitation dispute is properly
before the court regardless of whether there is an actual custody or visitation between
the legal parents. See Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 863; Perry v. Superior Court, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 583 (Ct. App. 1980).
148. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 863. See infra part IV.A.2. for discussion of visitation
rights based on de facto parent status.
149. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
150. [d.
151. [d.
152. [d. at 863.
153. [d.
154. [d. at 863-64.
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Over the objections of both parents and contrary to the recommendations of the family counselor and child psychologist,
the trial court awarded the father's former girlfriend visitation
under California Civil Code section 4601. 11111 The trial court apparently based its decision upon a bare preponderance of the
evidence that visitation was in the child's best interests. 11l8 The
California Court of Appeal reversed. 11l7 Not only did the Court of
Appeal doubt whether such visitation was in the child's best interests, the court held that such a determination was an insufficient basis for awarding visitation rights over the joint opposition of the child's parents. IllS The court found that, except where
the Legislature has specifically provided, courts may not grant
visitation to a nonlegal parent under section 4601 over the joint
opposition of the child's legal parents merely on a finding that
such a grant would be in the best interests of the child. 11l9 Where
the legal parents are in joint opposition, the court held that visitation should not be granted without clear and convincing evidence that denial of such would be detrimental to the child. 180
Although no previous cases addressed the nature of the
findings necessary to award visitation, the Gayden court relied
on "the strong legislative preference for the rights of· parents
over those of nonparents."181 The court acknowledged that custody and visitation differ in important ways but found that the
parental preference expressed in section 4600 was relevant to determinations involving visitation because visitation is a limited
form of custody.18l1 The court also reasoned that "judicially compelled visitation against the wishes of both parents can significantly affect parental authority and the strength of the family
unit." 18s The court was persuaded by an earlier decision which
held that visitation rights conferred by statute are "subordinate
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

[d. at 864; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601; supra note 143 and accompanying text.
Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
[d. at 869.
[d. at 868.
[d. at 867.
[d.
[d. at 865·66.
[d. The court looked to section 4600 which articulates the standard in custody

cases. Under section 4600, the "best interests" standard is applied to disputes between
legal parents, but a finding that custody with the parent would be detrimental is reo
quired in disputes between legal and nonlegal parents. CAL. CIV. CODE § 46oo(c).
163. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 865·66.
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to the preservation of the parent/child family unit."164
The Gayden court also looked to the limited rights afforded
grandparents under section 4351.5. 1611 While a best interests
standard is used in determining whether to grant visitation to a
grandparent, there is a rebuttable presumption that visitation is
not in the child's best interests where the parties to the marriage
are in joint opposition to the grandparent receiving any visitation rights. 166 The Gayden court reasoned that section 4351.5
would be meaningless if visitation rights could be granted to a
nonlegal parent under section 4601 merely upon a finding that it
is in the child's best interests.167 Moreover, where there is a rebuttable presumption that visitation with a grandparent is not
in the child's best interests where the parents are in joint-opposition, the court reasoned that "the opposition of both parents
ought to be given even greater weight when visitation is sought
by unrelated persons not favored under [the current statutory
law]."168
Given the preferred status afforded to legal parents expressed in section 4600 and the deference given to parental
wishes under section 4351.5 and in the case law, the Court of
Appeal held that where the legal parents are in unified opposition to awarding visitation to a third party, the applicable standard for determining whether to grant visitation is a clear and
convincing showing that denying visitation would be detrimental
to the child. 169 A finding that such a grant would be in the best
interests of the child is insufficient. 170
The court, however, cautioned that its holding did not mean
that trial courts could never award visitation to nonlegal parents
over the objections of legal parents:
. We do not mean to suggest by this opinion that a
court must always submit to the objection of bio164. Id. at 866 (quoting In re Marriage of Jenkens, 172 Cal. Rptr. 331,334 (Ct. App.
1981».
165. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 867; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5 (b) (West Supp. 1993)
(recodified as CAL. FAMILY CODE § 3103(a) (West 1993».
166. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 867; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5 (k) (West Supp. 1993).
167. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 867; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5 (b).
168. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 867 (favoring stepparents and grandparents).
169. [d. at 867.
170. Id.
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logic or adoptive parents to a visitation award to
another person with whom their minor child has
developed a close attachment. As strong as the
rights of such parents must be, there may be instances in which a child would be significantly
harmed by completely terminating his or her relationship with a de facto parent. 17l
The Gayden court suggested the following test for granting visitation to a de facto parent:
[Where an individual has] (1) lived with the child
for a substantial portion of the child's life; (2)
been regularly involved in providing day-to-day
care, nuturance [sic] and guidance for the child
appropriate to the child's stage of development;
and, (3) been permitted by a biologic parent to
assume a parental role. 172
The Gayden court's apparent willingness, in certain circumstances, to grant nonlegal parents visitation over the objections
of legal parents is promising. However, the test has yet to be
applied in an action under the UP A or FLA to support granting
visitation to a nonlegal parent. 17S
As courts struggle to apply the statutory law to nontraditional families, the decisions become more removed from children's interests; for example, children's interest in maintaining
relationships with those they perceive to be their parents. In an
attempt to avoid the harsh results of the statutory law, nonlegal
parents attempt to use existing legal theories as a basis for establishing parental rights. These theories are discussed in the
following section.
IV. EXISTING LEGAL THEORIES UNDER WHICH NONLEGAL PARENTS ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH
PARENT -CHILD RELATIONSHIPS
As previously discussed, California law limits a nonlegal
parent's ability to gain standing and restricts lower courts' juris171. [d. at 868.
172. [d.
173. See infra note 184 for juvenile court cases citing the Gayden test.
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diction to determine a nonlegal parents' parental rights. Individ. uals who consider themselves children's parents but lack biological, adoptive, or marital ties to the children have used existing
legal theories such as de facto parenthood, in loco parentis, and
equitable estoppel in attempts to gain standing or give courts
jurisdiction to decide their claims. This section discusses the use
of these existing legal theories and their respective
shortcomings.

A.

DE FACTO PARENTHOOD

The California Supreme Court has described a de facto parent as "that person who, on a day-to-day basis, assumes the role
of parent, seeking to fulfill both the child's physical and psychological needs for affection and care."174 De facto parenthood is
alleged in actions for custody and visitation by parties who fall
outside the statutory definition of legal parent, but who consider
themselves to be the children's parents.
1.

Child Custody

In In re B.G., 17& the California Supreme court held that de
facto parents, such as foster parents, have standing to "assert
and protect their own interests in the companionship, care, custody and management of the child."178 However, in determinations of custody, the court held that section 4600 applies;177
While de facto parents may have standing to bring their
claims, they will not be awarded custody according the same
standards applied in disputes between legal parents.178 The
court in B.G. expressly stated that, "We do not hold that a de
facto parent is a "parent" or "guardian" as those terms are used
174. In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 253 n.18 (Cal. 1974). See also CAL R. CT., rule
1401(a)(4) ("IA de facto parent is] a person who has been found by the court to have
assumed, on a day to day basis, the role of parent, fulfilling both the child's physical and
psychological needs for care and affection and who has assumed that role for a substan·
tial period.").
175. In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1974).
176. Id. at 254.
177. Id. at 255.
178. Id. at 257-58. See also Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 272 Cal. Rptr., 212, 216 (Ct.
App. 1991).
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in Juvenile Court Law."179 Like other nonlegal parents, courts
may award de facto parents custody only if they establish that
custody with the legal parents would be detrimental to the
children. ISO

2.

Visitation

The California Court of Appeal indicated that there may be
certain circumstances that warrant an award of visitation to a de
facto parent over the objections of the child's legal parents. 18l In
Gayden, the court held that the applicable standard for determining visitation rights where the parents are in joint opposition
is whether the denial of visitation would be detrimental to the
child. 182 Although in that particular case the court denied visitation with the child's alleged de facto mother, the court went on
to suggest that under certain circumstances, visitation with a de
facto parent should be awarded. 18s
The Gayden court's willingness to consider the functional
role of a de facto parent in determining visitation rights while
protecting parental autonomy by requiring the permi&sion of the
biological parent is encouraging. However, the implications of
this case on functional parents seeking visitation is still unclear.
To date, no court has used the Gayden test to support an award
of visitation in an action brought under the UP A or FLA.184

179. B.G., 523 P.2d at 254 n.21.
180. Id. at 257·58. See also Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 272 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App.
1991); Guardianship of Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr 781 (Ct. App. 1983); In re Lynna B., 155
Cal. Rptr. 256 (Ct. App. 1979); In re Volkland, 141 Cal Rptr. 625 (Ct. App. 1977).
181. In re Marriage of Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862, 868 (Ct. App. 1991). See supra
part III.C. for discussion of the facts.
182. This standard is considerably easier to meet than the test applied in custody
disputes between legal and nonlegal parents. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
183. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 868. See supra part m.c for discussion of the cir·
cumstances which may warrant such an award.
184. Two cases involving juvenile dependency proceedings have cited the Gayden
test in awarding visitation to a de facto parent. See In re Robin N., 9 Cal. Rptr. 512, 515·
16 (Ct. App. 1992) (using Gayden test to support award of three·way visitation to child's
mother, father, and de facto father); In re Hirenia C., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 452 (Ct. App.
1993) (using Gayden test to support award of visitation to child's de facto mother who
had previously been the lesbian partner of child's adoptive mother).
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PARENTIS I8 &

The California Court of Appeal has described a person
standing in loco parentis as:
[A] person who has put himself [sic] in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship, without going through the formalities necessary to
legal adoption, ... stand[s] in loco parentis, and
the rights, duties and liabilities of such person are
the same as those of the lawful parent. IS8
California courts have used the common law doctrine of in
loco parentis in the context of tort law to impose upon persons
standing in loco parentis the same rights and obligations imposed by statutory and common law upon parents 187 and to confer certain benefits upon children such as more favorable inheritance tax treatment 188 and worker's compensation benefits. 189
However, California courts have never applied the doctrine of in
loco parentis. to give a nonlegal parent the same rights as a legal
parent in a custody dispute. 19o

C.

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

The doctrine of estoppel is:
[I]mposed by law in the interest of fairness to
prevent the enforcement of rights which would
work fraud or injustice upon the person against
whom enforcement is sought and who, in justifiable reliance upon the opposing party's words or
conduct, has been misled into action upon the be185. This doctrine is similar to the doctrine of de facto parenthood, and at least one
court has used the terms interchangeably. In re Marriage of Halpern 184 Cal. Rptr. 740,
747 (Ct. App. 1982).
186. Loomis v. State, 39 Cal. Rptr. 820, 822 (Ct. App. 1964).
187. See, e.g., Costello v. Hart, 100 Cal. Rptr. 554, 556 (Ct. App. 1972).
188. See, e.g., Loomis, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 823-24.
189. See, e.g., Moore Shipbuilding Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 196 P. 257,
260 (Cal. 1921).
190. Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 217 (Ct. App. 1991). A same-sex
partner advanced this theory arguing that the court could apply this doctrine to give her
the same custody and visitation rights as a legal parent. The court declined.
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lief that such enforcement would not be sought. leI
Under some circumstances, California courts have used the
doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent husbands from denying
paternity to avoid paying child support where the husbands
have previously represented to their wives' children that they
were their biological fathers. le2 The California Court of Appeal
has held that where: (1) a husband represented to the child that
he was his or her father; (2) the child relied upon the representation; (3) the child was unaware of the true facts; and (4) the
representation was of such a duration as to frustrate the opportunity for the child to establish a parent-child relationship with
the true biological father, the husband is estopped from denying
his paternity for the purpose of avoiding paying child support. lea
However, California courts have never used the doctrine of equitable estoppel against a biological parent to award custody or
visitation to a nonlegal parent. Ie•

V. RECOMMENDATION
The aforementioned theories and existing statutory law do
191. Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 436 N.E.2d 1265, (N.Y.
1982) (quoted in Brenda J. Runner, Protecting a Husband's Parental Rights When his
Wife Disputes the Presumption of Legitimacy, 28 J. FAM. LAW 115 (1989-90)).
192. See In re Marriage of Johnson, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121, 122 (Ct. App. 1979); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 708 (Ct. App. 1961). See also Polikoff, supra note 5,
at 491.
193. In re Marriage of Valle, 126 Cal Rptr. 38,41 (Ct. App. 1975); Clevenger, 11 Cal
Rptr. at 716-17. See also, In re Guardianship of Ethan S. 271 Cal. Rptr. 121, 130 (Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that a husband is estopped from asserting paternity based on a
presumption of fatherhood where he represents to a child that he is not the child's father
and the child relies on that representation).
194. Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 218 (Ct. App. 1991). A same-sex
partner argued that the court should apply the doctrine to prevent the biological mother
from denying the existence of a parent-child relationship that she encouraged and supported for many years where the purpose of her denial was to obtain sole custody of the
children. The court declined to do so. Although the court acknowledged that other states
have used the doctrine to prevent a wife from denying the paternity of her husband, the
court explained that its use in the out-of-state cases is based on "[olne of the strongest
presumptions in law. . . that a child born to a married woman is the legitimate child of
her husband." Runner, supra note 191, at 116 (quoted in Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at
218). Because Nancy S. involved a dispute between two unmarried, same-sex partners,
the court reasoned that the out-of-state cases were inapplicable because, here, no such
presumption existed. For a discussion of these out-of-state cases, see Runner, supra note
191, at 115. See also Ethan S., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 130; supra note 193 and accompanying
text.
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not recognize the reality of children's lives. Courts cannot make
the family life of all children uniform. As one legal scholar notes,
"[w]hen parents create a nontraditional family, that family becomes the reality of the child's life. "l9II Children's interests
should be protected within the context of their nontraditional
.
families. 19G
Current doctrines establishing parental rights must strain to
encompass the area of child custody and visitation. These doctrines were either not intended to deal with child custody and
visitation or were not intended to deal with nontraditional families. Even if nonlegal parents were able to establish custody and
visitation rights under these doctrines, the doctrines would still
be inadequate. Taken literally, none of these doctrines specifically requires the legal parent's cooperation in the creation of
the parent-child relationship. The doctrines focus exclusively on
the acts of the nonlegal parent, and the intent of the legal parent in establishing a parent-child relationship between the child
and nonlegal parent is irrelevant. Thus, parental autonomy remains unprotected, exposing legal parents to the possibility of
litigation brought by outsiders such as long standing child-care
providers, relatives, friends, or others whom the legal parents
never intended to function as their children's parents and whom
children do not perceive to be their parents. 19'7
A.

POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES

Two states have developed innovative approaches to child
custody and visitation disputes involving nonlegal parents, one
by statute and one by case law. A third approach is a scholarly
reassessment of parental status which no court or legislature has
yet adopted. 198 This section will discuss and analyze these three
approaches. Each approach is significant in that each acknowledges the reality of the children's lives in nontraditional family
environments and attempts to fashion rules to serve the children's interests within the context of those families should they
195. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 482.
196. [d.

197. The Gayden test, enunciated under the doctrine of de facto parenthood, does
provide for the protection of parental autonomy. See discussion supra part III.C.
198. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 483.
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dissolve. 199
1. Child-parent Relationship
An Oregon statute permits anyone who "has established
emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship with a child"
to intervene or petition for custody or visitation. 20o The statute
also permits any person who "has maintained an ongoing personal relationship with substantial continuity for at least one
year, through interaction, companionship, interplay and mutuality" to petition the court for visitation. 201 The court will grant
visitation "[i]f the court determines from clear and convincing
evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child and is
otherwise appropriate in the case."202 In addition to conferring
standing to persons with parent-child relationships, the statute
also gives the court broad discretion to grant "custody, guardianship, right of visitation, or other generally recognized right of
a parent or person in loco parentis" where the court determines
such a grant is appropriate and in the best interests of the
children. 203
This statute is in sharp contrast to California statutory law.
Under California law, courts have found that individuals basing
their custody and visitation rights on parent-child relationships
lack standing to assert such rights. 204 Under California statutory
law, individuals basing their custody rights on parent-child rela199.Id.
200. OR.

REV.

STAT. § 109.119(1) (1989).

201. Id. § 109.119(5).
202. Id.
203. Id. § 109.119(1). Child-parent relationship is defined as:
[AI relationship that exists or did exist, in whole or in part,
within six months preceding the filing of an action under this
section, and in which relationship a person having physical
custody of a child or residing in the same household as the
child supplied, or otherwise made available to the child food,
clothing, shelter and incidental necessaries and provided the
child with necessary care, education and discipline, and such
relationship continued on a day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay and mutuality, that fulfilled
the child's psychological needs for a parent as well as the
child's physical needs.
Id. § 109.119(4) (excluding foster parents unless the relationship continued for more
than three years).
204. Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990).
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tionships must first show that custody with the legal parents
would be detrimental to the children. 2011 Traditionally, California
courts have held that visitation rights of nonlegal parents must
give way if legal parents oppose the visitation. 208 The Oregon
statute allows the court to grant custody or visitation to a person
in a parent-child relationship where such a grant is in the best
interests of the child. 207
Unlike California statutory law, the Oregon statute allows
for joint-custody between a legal parent and nonlegal parent
over the objections of the legal parent. 20S The Oregon Supreme
Court stated that "it would never be proper to give custody to
someone other than the natural parent unless custody in the
other person best served the child's interests."209 While awarding joint custody would require a "best interests" standard,
"compelling reasons" are required before a court will deprive a
legal parent of custody in favor of a nonlegal parent. 210
One legal scholar described the Oregon statute as "the most
well-developed understanding of parental relationships absent
biological or adoptive ties."2l1 However, the same scholar also
criticized the statute for not sufficiently protecting parental
rights. 212 The statute does not require any showing of the legal
parent's intent to create a parental relationship between his or
her child and the third party. Under the statute, a live-in babysitter, boyfriend, girlfriend, or a relative who had lived in the
parent's home could seek custody or visitation. 213
The statute is also unnecessarily restrictive in its requirement that the petitioner have custody of or have lived with the
child within six months of bringing the action. 21 • This require205. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c).
20S. Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 21S-17 (Ct. App. 1991); Curiale,
272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. See supra part IV.A.2. for discussion of recent trends in conflict
with traditional holdings.
207. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1).
208. Intact lesbian-mother couples have been awarded joint-custody under the statute. In re L.O. & E.W., No. 15-89-0096 (Or. Cir. Ct., Lane Cty., Feb. 7, 1989).
209. In re Hruby, 748 P.2d 57, 6S n.9. (1987).
210. Id. at SO-S3.
211. Polikotf, supra note 5, at 48S.
212. Id. at 488.
213. Id.
214. Id.; OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(4).
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ment may exclude an individual who functions as a parent with
the legal parent's consent but who does not petition the court
within six months of the dissolution of his or her relationship
with the legal parent. 2111 If the individual remains a functional
parent, it is inappropriate to limit that person's relief to visitation and require proof that visitation is in the best interests of
the child. 216
2. Equitable Parenthood

An equitable parent is one who is not the biological parent
of the child but who desires such recognition and is willing to
accept the obligations of supporting the child, in return for "reciprocal rights" of custody and visitation.:m The Michigan Court
of Appeals created the doctrine of equitable parent in Atkinson
v. Atkinson.218 In that case, the mother of a four-year-old son
argued that the court should deny her ex-husband custody and
visitation because he was not the biological father of the child
conceived and born during the marriage. The Court of Appeals
granted the ex-husband custody, finding:
[A] husband who is not the biological father of a
child born or conceived during the marriage may
be considered the natural father of that child
where (1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship as father and child, or
the mother of the child has cooperated in the development of such a relationship over a period of
time prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce, (2) the husband desires to have the rights
afforded to a parent, and (3) the husband is willing to take on the responsibility of paying child
support. 219

Equitable parenthood is grounded in the theories of equitable estoppel and equitable adoption. 220 A significant aspect of
the doctrine is its recognition of the husband's rights based upon
216.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Polikoff, supra note 6, at 488-89.
Id.
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Mich. App. 1987).
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 616 (Mich. App. 1987).
Id. at 619.
Id. at 619-20.
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his relationship to the child, not based upon his marriage to the
child's mother.221 Under the equitable parent doctrine, a person
who is indisputably not the biological parent of the child may
acquire parental rights. 222
California courts have expressly declined to adopt the doctrine of equitable parenthood. In Goetz, the California Court of
Appeal refused to apply the doctrine to a stepfather's request
for joint-custody of his stepson. 223 The court acknowledged that
it is arguable that the Legislature gave limited recognition to the
equitable parent doctrine by giving stepparents limited visitation rights.m Yet, ultimately the court declined to recognize the
doctrine, again deferring to the Legislature because given the
"complex practical, social and constitutional ramifications" the
court believed that the Legislature is better able to consider the
expansion of the law in this area. 2211
Of the three approaches discussed in this section, equitable
parenthood is the only one that explicitly requires the legal parent's cooperation in creating a relationship which is parental in
nature. The author believes the major shortcoming of this doctrine is that it was conceived in the narrow context of marriage
dissolution proceedings, applying only to children born or conceived during the marriage. Thus, a court could distinguish this
case if faced with a dispute arising from the dissolution of a
same-sex or unmarried heterosexual relationship.226 A court,
however, should not do so. The test articulated in Atkinson
could easily be adapted from a marital situation to a nonmarital
one. 227 If a nonlegal parent satisfies the three elements of the
Atkinson test, he or she is no less a parent than was the husband in Atkinson.228

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Polikoff, supra note 5, at 484.
In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33 (Ct. App. 1988).
Id. See supra part III.A. for discussion of the facts.
Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 33; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5.
Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
Polikoff, supra note 5, at 485.
Id. (discussing the test's application to lesbian-mother relationships).
Id.
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3. Nonexclusive Parenthood

Nonexclusive parenthood is a hybrid of the child-parent relationship and equitable parenthood approaches. 229 Legal
scholar Katharine Bartlett230 proposed this approach but no
court or legislature has adopted it. 231 Her approach redefines
parenthood into a nonexclusive status and permits awards of
custody and visitation based on the child's best interests. 232
Under this approach, courts should grant party status to legal,
biological, and psychological parents in custody and visitation
disputes. Bartlett defines three criteria for identifying a psychological parent: (1) "physical custody of the child for at least six
months;" (2) "mutuality" where the adult's motivation is "genuine care and concern for the child and the child perceives the
adult's role to be that of [a] parent;" and (3) "the relationship
with the child began with the consent of the child's legal parent
or under court order."233
Like the Oregon statute, this approach requires that the
parent-child relationship be one of "mutuality." However, Bartlett's definition of mutuality provides that the child must perceive the adult's role to be that of a parent. 23' Bartlett notes
that if the child perceives the relationship to be subject to the
discretion of the legal parent, "a true psychological parenting relationship does not exist."23Ci
Unlike the Oregon statute and the existing legal theories asserted in California, this approach requires the relationship begin with "the consent of the child's legal parent or under court
order."286 While this is an important requirement, one legal
scholar has criticized it for not defining what specifically the legal parent must consent to. 237 To the extent that this approach
229. [d.
230. Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Duke University.
231. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Promise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed,
70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984). See also Polikoff, supra note 5, at 489.
232. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 489.
233. Bartlett, supra note 231, at 946-47.
234. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 489-90.
235. Bartlett, supra note 231, at 947.
236. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 489-90.
237. [d. at 490 ("Because parental autonomy would be eviscerated unless the stan-
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makes it clear that the child must consider the adult to be a
parent, the legal parent should also consider the other adult to
be a parent. 238

B.

REDEFINING PARENTHOOD

California courts have overwhelmingly declined to address
the problems relating to child custody and visitation specific to
nontraditional families by mechanically adhering to and narrowly interpreting existing statutory law. The courts, restricted
by existing statutory law, have often deferred to the Legislature
when forced to apply these statutes to nontraditional
relationships.239
The Legislature must respond. The Legislature should redefine parenthood to include functional parents. In addition to defining a legal parent as someone with a biological or adoptive tie
to the child, the definition should include an individual who
functions as a child's parent and whose relationship with that
child developed with the consent and cooperation of a legally
recognized parent. 240 Such a definition would fit the reality of
today's nontraditional families, allowing biological, adoptive,
and functional parents to compete for child custody and visitation on equal grounds.
By defining legal parents to include those in functional parent-child relationships, functional parents would gain standing
dard were rigid, parenthood should not be conferred unless the legal parent consents to
or cooperates in the formation of an explicit parent-child relationship between the adult
and the child.").
238. Id.
239. In Nancy S. the court reasoned:
By deferring to the Legislature in matters involving complex
social and policy ramifications far beyond the facts of the particular case, we are not telling the parties that the issues they
raise are unworthy of legal recognition. To the contrary, we
intend only to illustrate the limitations of the courts in fashioning a comprehensive solution to such a complex and socially significant issue.
Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (Ct. App. 1991). See also Curiale v.
Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (Ct. App. 1990); In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis, 250
Cal. Rptr. 30, 33 (Ct. App. 1988); Perry v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583, 586 (Ct.
App. 1980).
240. Polikoff, supra note 5, at 573.
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to bring their claims and compete on equal footing with biological and adoptive parents for custody and visitation. Because
functional parents would be considered legal parents, courts
would no longer require them to show that custody with the legal parents is detrimental before asserting custody rights of their
own.
The UP A defines the "parent and child relationship" as
"the legal relationship existing between a child and his [sic] natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes the
mother and child relationship and the father and child relationship."241 The author proposes that the statute be amended to
read "the legal relationship existing between a child and his or
her natural, adoptive, or functional parents . . . . " Under this
approach a functional parent is one who, though not a biological
or adoptive parent of a child, may be considered a parent where:
(a) the individual and the child mutually acknowledge the relationship as parent and child;
and
(b) the individual has made available to the child
food, clothing, shelter, and incidental necessaries
and provided the child with the necessary care,
education, and discipline; and
(c) the individual has resided with or had physical
custody of the' child for at least one year; and
(d) the parent-child relationship has developed
with the support and cooperation of the legally
recognized parent, with the intent that the relationship be parental in nature, or under court
order.242
241. CAL, CIV, CODE § 7001.
242. A similar amendment was proposed in an earlier note. See Delaney, supra note
11, at 210. The proposed statutory amendment included de facto parents, and the statu-

tory definition of de facto parent included the following criteria:
(1) The biological mother and the nonmarital partner must
have mutually decided to start a family prior to the child's
conception;
(2) the nonmarital partner and the child must mutually acknowledge a relationship as parent and child;
(3) the relationship must have been in existence for at least
one year prior to the time of filing the action to determine
parentage, during which time the nonmarital partner must
have had physical custody of the child or resided in the same
household as the child; and
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As legal parents, functional parents will be able to intervene or
petition for custody or visitation. The proposed definition will
eliminate standing and jurisdictional problems by elevating
functional parents to the status of legal parents. 243
Both the Legislature and the courts have expressed concern
for the protection of parental autonomy. The proposed approach
protects parental autonomy by requiring that the parent-child
relationship develop with the support and cooper~tion of the legally recognized parent, with the intent that the relationship be
parental in nature. This approach· also protects children's best
interests by preventing legal parents from cutting off, for any
reason, parent-child relationships which the legal parents initially supported and helped develop.
VI. CONCLUSION
Broadening the definition of legal parent and focusing on
the parent-child relationship will clarify existing uncertainties
related to parental rights and nontraditional families. Contrary
to existing approaches, the author's proposed approach will accommodate functional parents involved in a variety of nontraditional families should these families dissolve. In addition, by recognizing nontraditional family relationships, the law will no
longer condone disparaging community attitudes. This change in
the law may lead society to reevaluate many current positions.
(4) the nonmarital partner must have supplied or otherwise
made available food, clothing, shelter, and incidental necessaries and provided the child the necessary care, education,
and discipline, on a day-to-day basis, through interaction,
companionship, interplay, and mutuality that fulfilled the
child's psychological needs for a parent as well as the child's
physical needs.
Delaney, supra note 11, at 212. While the proposed criteria focus on the relationship and
seek to protect the biological parents, they are unnecessarily restrictive. The criteria certainly solve the problems faced by the lesbian-mothers in Nancy.S and Curiale, the two
cases the note addressed. However, they exclude stepparents and any other individuals
with whom the biological mothers did not agree to start families with prior to the children's conception. This would include individuals who develop relationships with the
children subsequent to the children's conception and birth or to men and women who
unintentionally conceive a child. Functional parent-child relationships may develop with
the consent and cooperation of the legal parents following the children's conception. Any
proposed legislative amendment must address such relationships.
243. The author derived the proposed criteria from the three previously discussed
approaches and from the Gayden test articulated by the California Court of Appeal.
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For example, as more men are legally recognized as functional
parents and are awarded custody and visitation, attitudes towards areas like child care and family leave may change, making
them more attractive to a broader range of people. These areas
are more likely to be addressed to the benefit of all parents, men
and women alike, should the Legislature include functional parents in its definition of parent.
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